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ABSTRACT 
The implementation of security methods and processes in general has had a decisive 
impact on the aviation industry. However, efforts to effectively coordinate varied 
aspects of security protocols between agencies and general aviation components 
have not been adequately addressed. Whether or not overall security issues, 
especially with regard to planning for catastrophic terrorist events, have been 
neglected at the nation's smaller airports is the main topic of this paper. For 
perspective, the term general aviation is generally accepted to include all flying 
except for military and scheduled airline operations. General aviation makes up 
more than 1 percent of the U.S. Gross Domestic Product and supports almost 1.3 
million high-skilled jobs in professional services and manufacturing and hence is an 
important component of the aviation industry (AOPA, n.d.). In both conceptual and 
practical terms, this paper argues for the proactive management of security planning 
and repeated security awareness training from both an individual and an 
organizational perspective within the general aviation venue. The results of a 
research project incorporating survey data from general aviation and small 
commercial airport managers as well as Transportation Security Administration 
(TSA) employees are reported. Survey findings suggest that miscommunication 
does take place on different organizational levels and that between TSA employees 
and airport management interaction can be contentious and cooperation diminished. 
The importance of organizational training for decreasing conflict and increasing 
security and preparedness is discussed as a primary implication. 
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METHODOLOGY 
Eighteen graduate and undergraduate students from the disciplines of 
aviation technology, aviation flight, aviation administration, and aviation 
security were recruited for this study. The research team coordinated with 
different types of aviation organizations, including regional, general, and 
corporate aviation, to both develop and implement the survey. The specific 
goal of the research team was to work on the development of a survey to 
solicit the opinions of knowledgeable individuals within the general aviation 
system concerning the degree of emergency catastrophe planning currently 
in place, basic knowledge of forensic protocols and the successful interaction 
of individual responsible parties within the overall system. Names and 
addresses were randomly selected from the Transportation Security 
Directory (Sweet, 2005b ). The questions themselves were comprised of 
elements from proposed questions obtained from industry representatives 
when asked what information would be of interest to them concerning 
emergency disaster planning and the effectiveness of interaction with the 
TSA. 
More specifically, development of the industry survey of catastrophe 
planning policies and practices occurred in four phases. First, each research 
team developed potential survey questions and queried industry 
professionals across the United States as to their interest in the subject 
matter. Second, collaboration occurred across the graduate and 
undergraduate students to construct a preliminary survey that integrated the 
ideas of each research team and incorporated relevant questions obtained 
from the industry professionals contacted. Third, industry and government 
representatives from each type of aviation organization again were contacted 
to comment on the final survey and make any additional recommendations 
as to content. After these discussions, some questions were deleted or 
modified. Fourth, the entire research team met to integrate the findings from 
the organizational interviews and finalize the survey. In that so many of the 
queried industry professionals recommended the same questions, a 
reasonable amount of validity was acquired. 
Two versions of the survey were developed; one for airport managers 
and one for TSA personnel. Virtually the same questions appeared on both 
surveys with only slight variations. The survey contained 40 questions, 
measured on a 7-point Likert scale, with a not applicable/don't know option. 
For example, one question posed the statement "current planning procedures 
need improvement" and asked respondents to indicate a response to this 
statement with strongly disagree (1), somewhat agree (4), and strongly 
agree (6). In addition, open-ended and closed-ended questions were asked to 
gather general demographics and information about security awareness 
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training and knowledge of forensic aspects of catastrophe protocols. For 
example, a close-ended, yes or no question asked whether "a training class, 
including both airport management and TSA personnel, based on forensic 
aspects of post-catastrophe planning, would be beneficial to the airports 
operational status." Respondents were then asked in an open-ended fashion 
why or why not and blank lines were provided to write in personal rationales 
for their responses. A comprehensive list of airports was generated including 
regional/feeder airports, general aviation, and corporate operations. This 
sample of responses was considered representative because the individuals 
who completed this survey were randomly chosen and reflected similarity in 
response. A total of 505 surveys were distributed to a representative sample 
of airport professionals and TSA personnel from the list of organizations 
either by mail or personal delivery. Specifically, a survey was sent to 250 
airport managers and 255 TSA employees across the United States. The 
sample size was small but it is believed a high degree of validity was 
obtained from interviewees. In addition, even though the respondent rate was 
also low, it is considered acceptable because no statistical analysis was 
conducted, only basic comparisons based on percentile statistics. Completion 
of the survey was purely voluntary. Out of the returned surveys, 64 contained 
usable data from airport managers and 28 from TSA employees. Several 
responses were not included in the analysis due to incompleteness. The 
response rate of usable surveys was therefore 27% for airport managers and 
13% for TSA employees. 
The survey concentrated on small to medium sized operations and not 
major airports. As background, the Federal Aviation Administration requires 
a full scale disaster drill every three years to test the emergency plan at 
airports certified for air carrier operations, but no such requirement exists for 
the type of airports included in this analysis. For example, at commercial 
airports, each certificate holder must coordinate an emergency plan with 
local law enforcement agencies, rescue and firefighting agencies, medical 
personnel and hospital organizations, principal airport tenants, and all other 
entities that have responsibility under the plan (Federal Aviation Regulations 
Part 139.325, n.d.). Again, by regulation, no such requirement exists for non-
commercial airports. Therefore, the results of the survey reflect the lack of 
equivalent plans for the smaller aviation operations throughout the nation. 
After careful analysis of the collected surveys, it was determined there are 
six major areas of concern in regard to the knowledge, training, and planning 
of catastrophe response among the responding personnel. Those areas have 
been designated: intra-departmental communication, inter-departmental 
communication, planning, education/training, forensics, and attitude. 
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INTRODUCTION/ LITERATURE SEARCH 
The managers of the new Department of Homeland Security have been 
struggling to combine 22 constituent programs and agencies to provide 
proper planning on a national level (U.S. General Accounting Office, 2003). 
Planning for a catastrophic event can seem like an exercise in futility and can 
lead planners to believe that whatever is prepared might be inadequate or 
possibly ineffective. Managers consequently tend to rely too heavily on 
government response in the event of a disaster. Since 9/11, state and local 
governments have established offices of homeland security or attempted to 
enhance the functions of existing emergency management departments (U.S. 
General Accounting Office, 2003). At the local and municipal level, 
however, disaster planning has lagged behind efforts seen at the national 
level (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2002). Additionally, 
opinion polls have generally found that managers believe terrorist attacks are 
definitely going to take place, but simultaneously downplay whether it is 
going to happen to their organizations (Mankin, & Perry, 2003). To ensure 
the viability of the aviation system in general, it is imperative that disbelief 
regarding terrorism not be translated into a lack of action on the part of 
aviation managers and planners. Not planning can lead to increased injury, 
or even death, to passengers and personnel, while also contributing to the 
destruction of evidence. This results in a decreased ability to respond to a 
disaster appropriately and to apprehend the culprits involved in any 
deliberately contrived terrorist attack. 
Additionally, airport officials need to at least be aware of appropriate 
emergency management and forensic techniques in order to safely react to 
the inevitable human toll and not to hinder any follow-on investigation. 
Having a decision plan can be useful in many respects. A plan to deal with a 
terrorist bomb, nerve gas or anthrax attacks is also useful in response to a 
workplace violence incident, earthquake impact, hazardous spill, large scale 
electrical failure, hurricane or flood (Mankin, & Perry, 2005). 
Piecing together evidence is the job of qualified forensic experts brought 
to the scene, but team arrival may not be immediate; especially in the case of 
international or remote locations. Airport managers can therefore take 
advantage of basic plans which are readily available and public upon which 
they can tailor individual plans. For example, the National Fire Protection 
Association (NFP A) preparedness standard is already well known and used 
in the business community. The NFP A document provides preparedness 
basics and is applicable to many transportation sectors. (NFPA 1600, 2004). 
It includes hazard identification, assessment of the organization's resources, 
development of procedures for responding to a disaster and resuming 
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operations, development of communication systems and employee training 
(Cadrain, 2004 ). Airport managers and the TSA would do well to utilize its 
contents and template. In conjunction, airport operators, supporting airlines 
and the TSA must take care not to destroy crucial evidence in the event of a 
catastrophe, no matter how overwhelming that task may first appear. The 
majority of terrorist attacks against aviation have used either explosives or 
incendiary devices, the outcome of which has resulted in both human and 
structural damage. 
There is of course a plethora of information and studies which have been 
done relating to the effects of a major commercial aircraft crash. However, 
there has been little work done on the threat awareness of small to medium 
sized airport managers, the effectiveness of their interaction with the TSA, 
their preparedness for major catastrophic events or their knowledge in the 
field of forensic investigation as it relates to aviation disasters. The 
responsibility of emergency preparedness and response in the event of a 
terrorist incident shifted from state and local governments to the federal 
government after 9/11. The concern raised by the event exposed the need to 
prepare and mitigate acts of terrorism and resulted in the federal 
government's financial support of approximately $11 billion from fiscal 
years 2002-2005 for state and local first responders (GAO Report, 2005). 
Section 2 of the Homeland Security Act (6 U.S.C.S 101) defines emergency 
response providers as including, "Federal, State, and local emergency public 
safety, law enforcement, emergency response, emergency medical (including 
hospital emergency facilities), and related personnel, agencies, and 
authorities" (6). Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 further defined 
the term first responder as: 
Individuals who in the early stages of an incident are responsible for the 
protection and preservation of life, property, evidence, and the 
environment, including emergency response providers as defined in 
section 2 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101), as well 
as emergency management, public health, clinical care, public works, 
and other skilled support personnel (such as equipment operators) that 
provide immediate support services during prevention, response, and 
recovery operations. (PDD 8, 2003) 
Airport managers clearly fit into these new definitions and will be held 
to the duty of reasonable care in protecting their facilities and acting 
appropriately in a disaster. 
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DATA ANALYSIS 
Intra-departmental communication 
It has often been said in management circles that plans are only good 
intentions unless they immediately translate into effective action. In addition, 
quality planning is critical to actual success (Farell, 2005). In conjunction 
with that perspective, respondents were specifically asked the question 
"what percentage of the time do you think miscommunication between 
personnel result in poor planning." Analysis of data indicates that both 
airport managers and TSA personnel believe that miscommunication results 
in poor planning about 50% of the time. These findings have several 
possible implications. The first may be that respondents have a sober view 
of communication issues in that they realize miscommunication does happen 
in organizations of all sizes from international airports down to the local 
grass strip. A second implication may be that as employees become 
aware that mistakes were made throughout the planning process, they correct 
them accordingly; factoring in the realization that miscommunication can 
result in poor planning. 
Results vary between specific geographical regions as seen in the chart 
below, but generally speaking, all agreed some miscommunication took 
place. However, it cannot be assumed that, at present, airport managers and 
TSA personnel have dysfunctional communication networks within 
organizations and areas of influence. The data collected speaks only to the 
frequency of poor planning that is generated from previous 
miscommunication. It is reasonable to say that at least half of the airport 
managers and TSA employees who responded recognize that improvement 
might be needed. 
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Figure 1. Estimate of Percentage of the Time Miscommunication between Airport 
Personnel Result in Poor Planning, for Airport Managers and TSA Personnel, by Location 
of Airport 
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Even though managers might concede that poor planning may result 
about half of the time, they still clung to the belief that current planning was 
adequate. In light of recent events, both natural and terrorist, this premise is 
suspect at best. A revealing survey question asked "current methods of post-
catastrophe readiness planning and training need improvement at this 
organization." The results indicate that personnel generally felt that current 
plans were adequate, as shown in the Figure 2. However, planning often 
seems not to be as effective in time of tragedy as expected and improved 
planning based on inter- and intra-organization cooperation can provide 
more successful results. Because planning should encompass the entire 
organization, assembling a disaster recovery team that represents all areas of 
the organization is the best way to approach the effort. That translates to 
complete cooperation between local authorities, the TSA and internal 
personnel. In the best of circumstances, the team should perform a business-
impact analysis, help to develop and implement a recovery plan, test the 
validity of the plan, and execute the plan if and when a disaster strikes 
(Udelso, 2005). 
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Figure 2. Level of Agreement that Current Methods of Post-catastrophe Readiness 
Planning and Training Need Improvement at Their Organization, for Airport Managers 
and TSA Personnel 
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Consequently, organizations should always identify and address 
miscommunication issues with active feedback, training, and self-reporting 
systems for all employees. As in any organization, the human element 
creates the possibility for misunderstanding, error, or loss due to the actions 
of specific individuals. Human factors play a role in the design of any 
effective management and security plan within any environment. Therefore, 
because some miscommunication is inevitable, it is important for 
organizations, like airports, to have several layers of redundant planning 
built into the response capability (Sweet, 2005a). The results of the survey 
reflect that managers of small and medium sized airports and the TSA do not 
currently recognize this need. 
Inter-departmental communication 
Many different types of people, equipment, and governing organizations 
comprise civil aviation and all integrate into a complex system. If just one 
point in this divergent system is vulnerable, the entire system is equally 
exposed to that vulnerability. Potential miscommunication between primary 
government agencies responsible for security and the implementers is 
therefore deserving of critical analysis. Of note is the fact that both airport 
managers and TSA personnel feel they communicate best with a person who 
has an aviation background. Unfortunately, many TSA employees have little 
to no aviation education or experience. Additionally, the only group to list 
TSA personnel as easy to communicate with was TSA personnel. This 
reflects the likely existence of a communication barrier between airport 
management and the TSA. One airport manager went so far as to write he 
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communicated well with "all except TSA." The graph below portrays a 
visual representation of the perceived effectiveness of communication within 
an organization during a crisis. 
Figure 3. Level of Effectiveness of Community within My Organization in Times of Crisis, 
for Airport Managers and TSA Personnel, by Location of Airport 
Average Effectiveness of Communications within Organization in 
times of Crisis 
Region 
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Data further indicates that only airport managers felt at ease talking with 
pilots, whereas TSA personnel indicated an indifference to them and their 
associated skills. This lack of focus regarding an essential element of the 
aviation hierarchy also evidences a distinct communication boundary 
between the TSA and the industry. Communication problems in this specific 
arena is disconcerting considering the importance of the link between TSA, 
the pilot and passenger security. In general, the data point toward the 
conclusion that the industry, in all aspects, lacks the ability to exchange 
information on a well-managed basis. Concurrently, the more experienced 
the operator, the less likely they believed in the effectiveness of the total 
communication chain, even though they did often express trust within their 
own organization. 
As regards preparation, TSA personnel replied they had post-
catastrophe/terrorism plans for general aviatiOn airports and that 
coordination between agencies responsible for them was in place. Airport 
managers on the other hand did not support this conclusion. The divergent 
responses either indicate a distrust of the TSA's plans, not having plans, or 
poor communication between the airport manager and the TSA that such 
plans do exist. The disaster management process is driven by the 
understanding that nothing happens without a plan and that no plan is ever 
finished. When the smoke clears, the organizations that survive are the ones 
that constantly build, test and constantly improve disaster management plans 
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(Bean, 2002). Unfortunately, the surveyed airport managers appear to be 
comfortable with the current information gap that seems to exist between the 
TSA and general aviation airport management. The lack of direct contact, or 
oversight, was seen as a plus and not a negative by airport managers. One 
airport manager surprisingly returned the questionnaire asking "what is the 
TSA ?" Training, and the continuing need for it, was a different matter. 
Further training, as regards security planning, was supported by TSA 
personnel but not airport managers in the field. TSA personnel rate security 
training as more effective than airport managers do but both organizations 
indicated current training is effective even when there was a lack of it. Only 
airport managers in the Northwest Mountain region considered training not 
to be effective at all. 
More importantly, the data show that airport managers do not feel, on 
average, that they would work effectively with the TSA in times of a crisis 
or tragedy. Meanwhile, TSA personnel, on average, believe the opposite. 
This gap again highlights the communication problems between these 
organizations. Unsurprisingly, and as already stated, TSA personnel 
indicated they consider themselves easier to work with more frequently than 
airport managers do. The averages, both overall and regionally-based, show 
a wide discrepancy. For example, TSA personnel in the Alaskan region 
overwhelmingly noted that an it-won't-happen-here attitude permeates the 
environment. These data further support the contention that communication 
between the TSA and airport management is poor, and is even poorer when 
it specifically comes to security of the facility. 
In light of the expressed attitudes, it is noteworthy that both groups feel 
miscommunication results in poor planning due to faulty communication. 
This assessment calls into question the validity of post-catastrophe plans. 
There is obviously miscommunication between airport managers and the 
TSA and therefore the plans might not be as effective or of as high quality as 
they could. More specifically, airport managers have more communication 
problems stemming from the use of acronyms and accessibility. TSA 
personnel indicate internal communication problems are rooted more in 
technology and personalities. Overall both groups indicated all four of the 
listed items-acronyms, accessibility, personalities, and technology-
interfered with effectiveness. However, not any one item was noted more so 
than the others. 
In analyzing the communications mode data, the order of perceived 
effectiveness between participants and modes of communication highlights 
some differences. It appears that TSA personnel are more comfortable with 
face-to-face, phone, electronic communications, written communications, 
and radio communications, in that order. Airport managers preferred 
electronic communications most, followed by written, phone, face-to-face, 
and, finally, radio. The differences in the preferred forms of communication 
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likely contribute to the gap in communications between airport managers and 
the TSA. Several TSA personnel also referred to the use of Blackberry 
devices and weekly meetings as most useful. Although the differences may 
appear minor, they do occur and are a contributing factor to overall lack of 
optimal communication. Experts recommend that a manager choose a 
system. They agree that each manager needs to designate one primary 
method to communicate. The method chosen must work with available 
technology, the group's preferred style, and the staffs skill level (Neil, 
2005). 
Training and planning as a combined function 
The fundamentals of basic security are based upon proper planning, 
training and eventually executing the two seamlessly. However, planning, 
even if properly drafted, will only be successful if management wholly 
supports the concept. All too often, management does not support the needs 
of proper security until after tragedy and great loss occurs. Even then, the 
mindset is frequently lost when the immediate demand for increased security 
has rescinded. Therefore, it is imperative that upper-management always 
keep the issue in the forefront. 
By arming themselves with the knowledge they need to understand and 
manage catastrophic risk, airports can more accurately gauge the full 
spectrum of potential catastrophic risk they face, the financial impact 
those risks pose and their own abilities to handle that impact. Such 
knowledge does not have to be imported, however. In most cases, it 
already exists within the organization and needs only to be identified, 
captured and harnessed. Once done, it can drive an ongoing internal 
education process that will boost the ability to better manage 
catastrophic risk. (Otterson, 2005, p. 46) 
The survey showed some interesting perceptions about planning: 
specifically, comfort levels of upper management, openness to making 
suggestions, and sense of readiness to respond to a catastrophic event. 
As previously discussed, despite the relatively recent tragedies of 9/11, 
train bombings in Madrid and London, and hurricane Katrina in New 
Orleans, a significant portion of surveyed TSA personnel still felt that 
current methods of post-catastrophe readiness planning are sufficient and do 
not need improvement. Arguably, this is a function of a lack of proper 
training. As a regulative body of transportation security and a coordinating 
branch of public safety, it is of concern that any transportation component or 
regulatory agency retains that perception of preparedness. And when 
multiple city and government response plans have been exposed as weak-
exhibiting multiple degrees of failure resulting in loss of life as well as 
critical infrastructure-the perception verges on dangerous. Training and 
planning are two tasks that should be routinely supplemented with 
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technological advancements, process improvements, and personnel 
refinements as well as enhanced practice efforts to ensure proper execution. 
Confidence--even if it does not rise to the level of overconfidence-
conjures a scenario that has never proven to be very effective. There needs to 
be constant momentum for improvement, especially since recent events have 
proved that the minimally-required planning has not been adequate to handle 
the needs. The survey has exposed responses of complacency which could 
prove to have catastrophic results if not addressed. 
Airport manager respondents were content with current training. It may 
be prudent to mention that when terrorists were selecting viable airports to 
carry out 9/11 they evaluated airports at many different cities. Assessments 
calculated likelihood of resistance and preparedness. Arguably, many 
airports evaded looming tragedy simply by being better prepared than 
another facility. Airport security is critical not only for the well being of a 
facility, but also of the public. Proximity to power plants, critical 
infrastructures, and national democratic symbols all are added reasons to be 
more prepared. It was not evident that airport managers accepted this 
perspective but it is critical that an organization be comfortable accepting 
new ideas for post-disaster readiness and awareness training. 
Action is frequently most effective when implemented locally so that 
local conditions are understood, and objections or concerns can be dealt 
with more immediately and directly, assuming that appropriate 
mechanisms exist to effect the desired action. Individuals can then be 
motivated to change their behavior, to spread the message and 
unofficially monitor, evaluate and enforce desired policies and actions. 
Disaster-risk reduction, sustainability and development cannot be forced 
on or "done" for others; people must accept those processes and 
undertake them themselves. (The 9/11 Commission Report, 2004) 
While both TSA personnel and airport manager respondents feel current 
methods of catastrophe readiness planning are sufficient and do not need 
improvement, they did indicate an openness to suggestions about new 
training regarding post-catastrophe readiness and response. The graphic 
below indicates the high degree of agreeability to accept new ideas. Security 
is often one of the least funded budgetary items and frequently many 
suggestions, though acceptable, are never realized due to cost considerations. 
Ultimately, however, it should be stressed that it is cheaper to prevent than it 
is to repair. This is counter intuitive to the finding that many respondents feel 
their facility has an it-won't-happen-here attitude. If a facility believes it is 
not prone to attack, it has no reason to adequately prepare and learn how to 
adequately respond. 
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Figure 3. Level of Comfort in Suggesting New Ideas, for Airport Managers and TSA 
Personnel, by Location of Airport 
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In summary, while TSA personnel and airport managers are open to 
suggestions, they seem overly confident that they will be able to respond and 
that they will not need to respond since their facility is not at risk. The only 
way to minimize physical costs of damage to a facility, disruption of the 
economy and loss of life is to have effective plans. Planning will enable 
faster response times, proper response by employees and allocation of 
resources by management. Clearly, adequate preparation is not likely when 
management believes it will not happen there. The Emergency Management 
Accreditation Program (EMAP) defines an emergency management program 
as "a jurisdiction-wide system that provides for management and 
coordination of prevention, mitigation, preparedness, and response and 
recovery activities for all hazards. The system encompasses all 
organizations, agencies and individuals responsible for emergency 
management and homeland security" (Bently, 2004). In other words, EMAP 
looks at coordination of a multi-agency, multi-disciplinary system for all 
activities that are needed to prevent, mitigate against, prepare for, respond to, 
and recover from a disaster. The program would provide yet another tool 
useful within the aviation venue. 
Education/training 
This survey contained several inquiries to determine the level of 
experience, education, and training of TSA employees and airport managers. 
It was determined that airport managers have held positions about three 
times longer than TSA employees, and total years of experience in the 
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aviation field is about seven years longer. Certainly one reason that airport 
managers have held positions longer than TSA employees is because the 
TSA was not established until passage of the Aviation Security and 
Transportation Act in November 2001. Unfortunately, it is obvious that the 
TSA has not sought to hire individuals with extensive aviation experience. It 
is important to also note that the average total years of aviation experience 
for airport managers was about 27 years while the total for TSA employees 
was far less. Admittedly, experience measured in years does not necessarily 
equate to quality experience and increased knowledge in the field, but it is 
still worthy of recognition. An airport environment is unique and complex 
and experience in the industry can only add to disaster preparedness. 
Regardless, even with more experience in the aviation industry, airport 
managers feel less urgency as it relates to security training. When asked, 
"What is the frequency of your organization's recurrent security training" 
almost all of the TSA employees indicated they have some frequent training, 
with two responding that they did not know. 
Figure 4. Number of Years in Their Current Position, for Airport Managers and TSA 
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Airport managers, on the other hand, vary widely on frequency of 
training, and 30% responded they never had recurrent security training. 
These results show the need for standardized training among TSA employees 
and mandated requirements for airport manager training. When asked to rate 
how consistently the training policy was followed on a scale of one to five 
with one being never followed and five being always followed, airport 
managers responded with an average of 3.5 indicating that their training 
policy is followed for the most part. TSA employees averaged 4.4 indicating 
that their policy is followed more frequently than airport managers. It is also 
worth mentioning that no TSA employees answered 1 or 2 while there were 
many airport managers that responded their training policy was never 
followed. Therefore, while the TSA needs to work out standardization of 
training, airport managers need to create, implement, and continue security 
training. Of note is the fact that airport managers also need to include the 
agencies they will depend on in the event of an emergency in their training. 
For example, the police are clearly interested in training programs that entail 
an understanding of the complexity of airport policing and an attempt to 
professionalize it. It is important that they recognize an airport is a 
demanding, people-oriented environment, which requires some unique 
understanding from law enforcement officers, as well as knowledge of all 
aspects of airport and air carrier operations. "Due to extensive airport 
regulations and the demands placed upon airport police officers, the aviation 
security community should fully address the challenges of full-spectrum 
training and oversight" (Raffel, 2001). 
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Figure 6. Frequency of Recurrent Security Training, for Airport Managers and TSA 
Personnel 
:fl 35 
~ 30 
8. 25 
rn &! 20 
0 15 
c 10 
~ 5 
~ 0 
Frequency of Recurrent Security Training 
Frequency of Training 
1111 Airport Managers 
1111 TSA Employees 
This survey also documents that TSA personnel rate the effectiveness of 
awareness training higher than airport managers do. Airport managers and 
TSA employees were asked to rank the effectiveness of the organization's 
current method of security awareness training, on a scale from one to five 
with one being not effective to five being highly effective. Airport managers 
averaged a 3.3, indicating they feel the method is somewhat effective. TSA 
employees averaged 3.9, indicating they feel the method of security 
awareness training is quite effective. Again, it is worth mentioning that no 
TSA employees answered 1 or 2 while there were many airport managers 
that responded training is not effective. So, not only must there be a training 
program in place, but it must also be effective; and that apparently is not 
occurring among airport managers to the extent it is for TSA employees. 
Another important training topic is post-catastrophe training. Since 9/11 
less than half of the airport managers have provided or received additional 
catastrophe training in contrast to almost three-quarters of TSA employees. 
Overall, it is apparent that training is an area that needs to receive more 
attention. It is also important to understand that the responses to this survey 
are solely what the airport managers and TSA employees think and feel, not 
necessarily what is actually occurring. For example, they may think that the 
training is effective but perceptions are often notoriously wrong. 
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Forensics 
The success of the United States law enforcement community is derived 
from many applications and techniques but none more essential than the 
utilization of forensic science. Forensic protocols are varied and include the 
use of entomology, odontology, taphonomy, and similar forensic 
methodologies. However, the importance of these protocols and others seem 
to be misunderstood by the respondents. There is an apparent disconnect in 
comprehending the importance of forensic science as it pertains to aviation 
catastrophes. In the event of an aviation industry terrorist incursion timely 
access and undisturbed evidence is critical to the forensic investigator. The 
investigator must be given unfettered access to the incident scene and know 
that only essential emergency response activities have taken place in regard 
to event scene alteration. The alteration of human remains or physical 
evidence, in any form, greatly restricts the ability of the investigator to 
successfully complete his task. With this identified, it is critical that all 
aviation industry personnel understand the importance of forensic protocols 
and how they contribute to the apprehending of perpetrators in a catastrophic 
event. 
Figure 7. Percent of Respondents who have Received Training in the Field of Criminal 
Forensics, for Airport Managers and TSA Personnel 
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When questioned if they felt that a minimal knowledge of forensic 
protocols was important both TSA personnel and airport managers indicated 
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that it was of little concern to them. They both continued by describing the 
importance of individual areas of forensic science as it would benefit them in 
their creation of a post-catastrophe plan. Unfortunately, they both concluded 
that this knowledge, as it applied to all forensic areas noted within the 
survey, was of little value to them. Finally, they were asked to indicate if 
they had ever received any training within the field of criminal forensics. Of 
those responding from the TSA, 36 percent indicated that they had received 
this type of training. Of those responding as an airport manager, only 13.6 
percent indicated that they had received such training. This lack of 
understanding of the importance of forensics can be contributed to the 
minimal education provided. 
When asked if they were interested in the topic of forensic investigation 
both TSA personnel and airport managers were mildly interested. Again, 
these results would demonstrate the lack of understanding to the benefits this 
field of study brings to the aviation security. When surveyed in regard to 
whether the organization was more reactive than proactive both survey 
groups indicated an overwhelming response to the reactive. This reactive 
nature seems to be validated by all previously mentioned replies. 
Additionally, both survey groups felt strongly that their organization would 
not react to a catastrophic event in such a manner as to result in the loss of 
critical information. However, when questioned on the effectiveness of the 
organization's current method of security training they both leaned toward 
the not effective response. Together, these responses seem to contradict each 
other and lead to the questioning of each organization's ability to truly 
perform in a manner that will not result in the loss of critical information. 
The frequency of training within each organization did not clearly 
demonstrate any pattern; therefore no implied conclusion can be drawn from 
this question as it applies to forensic protocols. 
Survey results indicated that airport managers have held their positions 
approximately four times longer than TSA personnel respondents. 
Additionally, airport managers have approximately 2.5 times the experience 
within the aviation industry. These data combined with the aforementioned 
questions and results related to forensic science do not allow us to form any 
clear conclusion based upon years in position or experience. Indicators show 
that the area of forensic science, as it is applied to catastrophic events within 
the airline industry, is grossly misunderstood and under emphasized. 
Attitude 
Personal attitudes play a key role in day-to-day interaction among 
individuals and small and large organizations. This element of human 
behavior is both complex and unavoidable. The attitude of individuals and 
organizations directly responsible for aviation security obviously should 
receive a great deal of attention due to the tremendous impact it has on the 
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American people and national security. The safety and security of 
communities throughout the nation are a responsibility that is shared by all 
residents, by government, and by the private sector. Their attitudes will 
reflect their success (Kelman, 2005). Specifically, this study examined how 
security personnel prepare to respond to catastrophic events. The attitudes 
and perceptions of the security personnel surveyed in our study are the same 
that are being portrayed as the acceptable model to subordinates. There is no 
simple way to determine one source of attitudes from the respondents; 
however some general conclusions can be made based upon information 
given. 
Airport managers that responded have been in their positions longer than 
the TSA employees. The first question asked was "how many years have 
you been an airport manager?" Although the question was worded 
identically for both airport managers and TSA employees, the period of time 
in which airport managers have been in an airport management role was 
significantly greater than the responses of the TSA employees. Most airport 
managers have at least 10 years of experience. 
The second question asked "how many years have you been at your 
current position?" The responses for airport managers showed little job re-
positioning; in fact many of them have not changed jobs since they originally 
took their current position. The respondents from the TSA indicated more 
shift in job responsibilities. This should come as no surprise due to the 
changes which occurred related to the governing of airport security by the 
formation of the Department of Homeland Security. It is believed airport 
mangers feel a greater sense of comfort with current operations because of 
time spent in the aviation industry. This sense of comfort is believed to be 
the reason why airport mangers are not highly concerned with security 
planning and training. Most indicated they feel current measures are 
adequate. Another rational for this belief is the fact airport managers have 
other duties beside security in their job descriptions. 
Another question asked to rate-on a scale from one to five, with one 
being the least vulnerable, and five being the most vulnerable-"due to your 
geographic location, how vulnerable do you believe your organization is to a 
terrorist attack?" The first unsettling part of the responses is that neither 
group expressed great concern that their facility is vulnerable. This could be 
due to the fact that there is no clear distinction of baseline understood 
vulnerability for all aviation facilities. Nonetheless, airport managers more 
predominately indicated they feel their facility is at the lowest possible level 
of vulnerability based upon the wording of the question. When responding to 
the question "I believe that there is an 'it won't happen here' attitude at this 
facility," a higher level of airport mangers-compared to TSA employees-
felt this type of attitude does exist. Noting that most TSA employees have 
only held their current positions since soon after 9/11 security preparedness 
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and planning seem to be a more pressing issue. With a lower level of job 
experience in their current positions, 9/11 is also fresher in the minds of TSA 
employees. Another reason why security is a higher priority for TSA 
personnel may be because they are government employees who feel direct 
pressure from federal agencies to insure proper security measures are in 
place. 
Figure 8. Perceived level of Vulnerability to a Terrorist Attack for their Organization, Due 
to Geographic Location, for Airport Managers and TSA Personnel, by Location of Airport 
Due to Geography- Average Perceived Vulnerability 
5.00 
4.50 
.. 
.!!:C 4.00 
.Of! I!! .. 
3.50 .. c 
.;~ 
> ... 3.00 
o:z: 
c.~ 2.50 II .C 
~ II 
"' 
2.00 
1.50 
1.00 
",~~ 0.;::- 0.;::- 0"' <'}' 
,$$' Of «?<$ <v'li' ,._v 
""0~ c_,O ~'If 0 
Region 
130 Journal of Air Transportation 
Figure 9. Belief of the Existence of an "It Won't Happen Here'' Attitude at their 
Organization, for Airport Managers and TSA Personnel, by Location of Airport 
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Overall, the attitudes and perceptions of the current state and future 
needs of security differ greatly between airport mangers and TSA 
employees. Certainly this group of researchers believes this is an area which 
needs reevaluation and more consideration. The first step in taking action is 
realizing change is needed. It is no easy task to convince personnel this 
change is in fact needed; however, this group of researchers believes this 
threat is real and this report will reflect the need to change. Convincing the 
general aviation component of the industry that the threat is indeed real 
poses a significant challenge and is worthy of further study. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The data collected support what is already widely suspected; namely 
that catastrophe planning within the aviation community needs to be 
improved. More specifically, more attention needs to be given to the current 
threat to the general aviation community in general. It is simply too easy to 
access the facilities and to engage in nefarious conduct without raising too 
much suspicion. Common sense dictates that the criminal or terrorist is more 
comfortable accessing the least secure facility and the one presenting the 
least risk. Admittedly, the terrorist, unlike the criminal, is rarely concerned 
with escape but they still need to gain entrance to the transportation network 
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to disrupt it. To ignore the desire of terrorists to possibly use the general 
aviation community to attack a larger target suggests the old head-in-the-
sand cliche may be a reality. The results of the survey minimally support the 
conclusion that miscommunication between agencies takes place internally 
and externally which could result in less effective response to a catastrophic 
event. 
Additionally, it seems apparent that miscommunication between the 
TSA and airport managers is contributing to the lack of improvement in this 
area. The TSA has focused on larger commercial airports which service the 
nation's transportation requirements but has neglected smaller and more 
vulnerable facilities. This is of particular significance if the small to medium 
sized airport is near a dangerous critical infrastructure such as a nuclear 
power plant, chemical weapons storage facility or large dam. The survey 
seems to support the conclusion that a general complacency does indeed 
exist to varying degrees depending on the facility. Attitudes may have turned 
complacent over time since 9/11 or never existed in the minds of the 
operators at any time previously. It seems prudent that attention to planning 
and training should be revitalized before another catastrophe occurs. Efforts 
based on both the adequacy of existing plans and the potential current threat 
is a function of education. No one-especially a facility manager-wants to 
seriously believe that a disaster will take place under their watch on their 
facility. Such contentment can unfortunately be fatal. 
The general aviation industry basically portrayed only a mild interest in 
the field of forensics. This lack of understanding regarding the significant 
contribution that such basic knowledge can provide in capturing those that 
have engaged in a terrorist act is disappointing. The democratic system 
prides itself on bringing those who commit crimes to justice. The forensic 
teams at work after catastrophic events take place can be greatly hindered by 
acts committed by well-intentioned but ill-informed individuals with access 
to a scene prior to the arrival of the forensics team. The damage such 
personnel can inflict on a crime scene can be substantial and hinder later 
prosecutorial efforts. This is another topic worthy of further research. 
It is not within the parameters of this paper to document the actual 
current threat but numerous government officials and security experts had 
repeatedly used the phrase "not if but when" in referring to the next attack. 
Unfortunately, many aviation professionals have lost sight of the potential 
for a massive catastrophic event-either natural or terroristic-and have not 
adequately planned to deal with the results. 
It is critical that upper management-at a minimum-support efforts to 
improve communication, to place emphasis on planning and to continue to 
improve security awareness training as well as law enforcement and forensic 
training. Education should be standardized and mandatory in order to 
effectuate the best results. It is apparent that voluntary requests or 
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suggestions to improve security are seen by the aviation professional as an 
unnecessary cost to an industry already in need of improved profitability. 
The survey also reflects that the TSA does not necessarily speak the same 
language as the aviation professional, especially those of pilots. To ignore 
the advice and experience of such a critical component in the aviation chain 
does not bode well for future cooperation or success. The aviation industry is 
populated with highly trained professionals who function in a unique 
environment which includes airspace, airport facilities and supporting 
infrastructure. To have the government agency that regulates security at 
these facilities to not have the same competency level in such a unique 
environment should also be addressed. 
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APPENDIX 
Individual Survey Response Analysis 
Airport Managers: 
1. How many years have you been an airport manager? 12.99 
57 responses 
2. How many years have you been at your current position? 12.21 
59 responses 
3. What are the total years of your aviation experience? 27.61 
57 responses 
Overall, very experienced in aviation field in terms of years 
4. To which geographic region are you assigned? 
[ 0 ] Alaskan [ 12 ] Central [ 6 ] Eastern [ 16 ] Great Lakes 
[ 4 ] New England [ 6 ] NW Mountain [ 6 ] Southern [ 9 ] Southwest 
[ 2] Western-Pacific 
2 blank 63 total responses 
5. Due to your geographic location, how vulnerable do you believe your 
organization is to a terrorist attack? (1=not vulnerable, 5=highly 
vulnerable) 1.758 62 responses 
Average response indicates feeling of invulnerability 
6. In your opinion, is it generally easier to communicate with a colleague 
who is: 
[ ] Military [ ] TSA [ 2 ] Law Enforcement [ 27 ] Has aviation 
background [ 5 ] A pilot [ 2] Management [ 17] No preference 
2 blank; 1 military, aviation background; 1 military, aviation, pilot; 2 
law enforcement, management; 1 aviation background, pilot, mgmt; 2 
aviation background, pilot; 1 all except TSA 
Easier to communicate with people with aviation background 
7. In your organization, please rate how effective you believe the necessary 
communication chain would be in a catastrophic situation. (1=not 
effective, 5=very effective) 3.459 61 responses 
General feeling that communication would be effective 
8. In general, you get better cooperation from: 
[ ] TSA [ 36] Local law enforcement [ 24] No preference 
1 neither; 2 blank 
Definitely not TSA; local law enforcement - this may because of the 
great number of response from small airports 
9. Does your organization have a post-catastrophic or post-terrorism 
incident plan? [ 27] Yes [ 32] No 4 blank 
Need more to have plan 
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a. If so, does this plan include any other partnering 
organizations? [ ] Yes [ ] No of yeses to 9a, only 1 
no, 24 yes, 2 blank 
b. Which ones? 
Main ones included local & state police/authorities, FBI 
Good to have other agencies involved, like to see more federal 
cooperation 
10. Have you provided/received any additional post-catastrophe training 
since the September 11th terrorist attacks to your employees? 
[27]Yes [33]No 3blank 
Required now for GA airport managers?? More need training, especially 
small airports; also why this number of 'no's is high, lots of small 
airports answered 
11. A class including airport management, airline personnel, and the TSA, 
based on communication and/or resource management is needed in your 
work environment. 
[ 16] Yes [ 41] No 6 blank 
a. Why or why not? 
Most of 'no's because small airport, yes good reasons 
Still important for small airport managers to attend session so that they 
can help create a plan that includes cooperation and communication 
between several agencies 
12. What is the frequency of your organization's recurrent security training? 
[ 15] Annual [ 7] Quarterly [ 3] Monthly [14 ] Periodic [2 ] Don't 
know [18 ] Never 2 blank; 1 annual, quarterly 
There are a lot of "nevers" for airport managers. Need more training 
13. Please indicate how consistently the above training policy is followed. 
(1=never followed, 5=always followed) 3.5714 49 responses 
Average indicates training policy generally followed 
14. How would you rate the effectiveness of your organization's current 
method of security awareness training? (l=not effective, 5=highly 
effective) 3.3158 57 responses 
Average indicates current security training is effective, but could be 
more effective 
15. In your opinion, how effectively do airport management and the TSA 
work with each other, especially during times of crisis or tragedy? 
(1=not at all, 5=very well) 2.8222 45 responses 
Average indicates airport management and TSA work together, but not 
very well 
16. In your current position in your organization, how comfortable would 
you feel suggesting new ideas regarding post-disaster 
readiness/awareness training? (1=not comfortable, 5=very comfortable) 
4.1964 56 responses 
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Average indicates most would feel comfortable 
17. Do you believe that your organization would take any action if an 
employee were to approach management and suggest new training 
regarding post-catastrophe readiness and response? 
[50]Yes [7]No 
Significant? Say yes 
18. Current methods of post-catastrophic readiness planning and training 
need improvement at this organization. (l=do not agree, 5=fully agree) 
2.7143 56 responses 
Average is middle of the road, showing need for improvement, but 
leaning toward disagreement with statement 
19. Information regarding post-disaster procedures is readily available in my 
organization to anyone who needs access. (l=do not agree, 5=fully 
agree) 3.0727 55 responses 
Average right down middle, access indeterminable 
20. Generally speaking, TSA employees are easy to work with. (l=do not 
agree, 5=fully agree) 2.82979 47 responses 
Average middle of road 
21. I am concerned that my organization would not be able to respond 
effectively to catastrophic event or terrorist attack. (l=do not agree, 
5=fully agree) 2.193 57 responses 
Average indicates they do not agree with this statement; organizations 
could respond to catastrophic event "or so they think" 
22. I am concerned that the quality of response from my organization could 
result in the loss of critical information to track down the perpetrators of 
a terrorist event at my facility. (l=do not agree, 5=fully agree) 
1.9821 56 responses 
Average indicates they do not agree with this statement 
23. I believe that there is an "it won't happen here" attitude at this facility. 
(l=do not agree, 5=fully agree) 3.1356 59 responses 
Average middle of road 
24. I believe that proper and repeated training would improve my 
organization's response to a terrorist attack. (l=do not agree, 5=fully 
agree) 3.069 58 responses 
Average middle of road; need for more training 
25. It is easier to communicate with a TSA employee who is: 
[ 4] A pilot [ 25] Has an aviation background [ 21 ] No preference 
3 pilot, aviation background; 1 both ok 
easier to communicate with people with aviation background 
26. My organization is more reactive than proactive. (!=strongly disagree, 
5=fully agree) 
2.6034 58 responses 
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27. What percentage of the time do you think miscommunication between 
personnel result in poor planning? (circle one) 
0% 1 10% 12 20% 5 30% 7 40% 4 50% 6 60% 1 70% 6 
80% 6 90% 5 100% 2 
45.455 avg 55 responses 
28. Have you ever received any training in the field of criminal forensics? 
[8]Yes [50]No 
Need training in forensics 
29. How frequently do the following interfere with communication between 
airport managers and the TSA? (l=never, 5=always) 
Acronyms (ex. TSA, DHS) 2.26 50 responses 
Personalities 2.3 50 responses 
Accessibility to one another 2.64 50 responses 
Technology 2.08 50 responses 
30. How often do airport managers and the TSA personnel use the following 
forms of communication? (l=never, 5=always) 
Written 2.8462 52 responses 
Face-to-face 2.4314 51 responses 
Electronic communication (email) 2.76 50 responses 
Phone 2.6275 51 responses 
Radio 1.25 48 responses 
Other: ________ _ 
31. With regard to the creation of post -catastrophic planning, how effective 
are the following forms of communication? (1=not effective, 5=very 
effective) 
Written 3.2364 55 responses 
Face-to-face 4.00 56 responses 
Electronic communication (email) 3.315 54 responses 
Phone 3.481 54 responses 
Radio 2.449 49 responses 
Other: ________ _ 
32. How helpful would the knowledge of the following basic forensic 
protocol be in the creation of a post-catastrophic plan for your 
organization? (1=not helpful, 5=very helpful) 
Fingerprinting 2.1176 51 responses 
Cadaver dogs 2.02 51 responses 
Odontology 1.9796 49 responses 
Entomology 1.959 49 responses 
Mental Health/Grief Training 2.62 50 responses 
Digital Photography 2.96 50 responses 
Other: _________ _ 
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33. Minimal knowledge of forensic protocols is not important. (1=strongly 
disagree, 5=fully agree) 2.7679 56 responses 
34. I am interested in the topic of forensic criminal investigation. 
(!=strongly disagree, 5=fully agree) 2.6491 57 responses 
Averages lean toward disinterest in forensics, but also lean toward 
forensics being important 
35. To the best of your knowledge, how close is your facility to the nearest 
nuclear power plant? 
[ 15 ] 50 miles [ 5 ] 75 miles [ 15 ] 100 miles [ 12] 200 miles [ 8] 
Don't know 4 over 200 
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TSA Employees: 
1. How many years have you been an airport manager? 10.2 9 
26 responses 
2. How many years have you been at your current position? 3.339 
28 responses 
3. What are the total years of your aviation experience? 19.75 
28 responses 
Less experience than airport managers, but still have many years 
experience in aviation 
4. To which geographic region are you assigned? 
[ 1 ] Alaskan [ 5 ] Central [ 4 ] Eastern [ 4 ] Great Lakes [ 1 ] New 
England [ 1 ] NW Mountain [ 7 ] Southern [ 4 ] Southwest [ ] 
Western-Pacific 1 Southeast 
5. Due to your geographic location, how vulnerable do you believe your 
organization is to a terrorist attack? (1=not vulnerable, 5=highly 
vulnerable) 2.63 27 responses 
Understand more so than airport managers that they are somewhat 
vulnerable to a terrorist attack 
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6. In your opinion, is it generally easier to communicate with a colleague 
who is: 
[ 1 ] Military [ 1 ] TSA [2 ] Law Enforcement [ 14 ] Has aviation 
background [ ] A pilot [ 3 ] Management [ 6 ] No preference 
Like airport managers, easier to communicate with people with aviation 
background 
7. In your organization, please rate how effective you believe the necessary 
communication chain would be in a catastrophic situation. (1=not 
effective, 5=very effective) 3.464 28 responses 
TSA feels their communication would be effective 
8. In general, you get better cooperation from: 
[ 4] TSA [ 7] Local law enforcement [ 16] No preference 
No preference 
9. Does your organization have a post-catastrophic or post-terrorism 
incident plan? [ 20] Yes [ 5] No 
Most have a plan 
a. If so, does this plan include any other partnering organizations? 
[ 19] Yes [ ] No 
b. Which ones? 
City fire, local police, etc 
Almost all of the plans include other organizations; good. 
10. Have you provided/received any additional post-catastrophe training 
since the September 11th terrorist attacks to your employees? 
[ 18 ] Yes [ 7 ] No 
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Almost % have had training; very good, much more than airport 
managers 
11. A class including airport management, airline personnel, and the TSA, 
based on communication and/or resource management, is needed in your 
work environment. 
[ 13 ] Yes [ 11 ] No 
a. Why or why not? 
TSA realizes more than airport managers that more training is needed, 
but still is about 50% yes 
12. What is the frequency of your organization's recurrent security training? 
[ 7 ] Annual [ 2 ] Quarterly [ 3 ] Monthly [ 7 ] Periodic [ 2 ] Don't 
know [ ] Never 3 annual, quarter, monthly, periodic 
TSA adheres to recurrent security training more so than airport 
managers 
13. Please indicate how consistently the above training policy is followed. 
(l=never followed, 5=always followed) 4.4783 23 responses 
Average indicates training policy almost always followed 
14. How would you rate the effectiveness of your organization's current 
method of security awareness training? (l=not effective, 5=highly 
effective) 3.9167 24 responses 
Average indicates TSA employees feel their training is effective 
15. In your opinion, how effectively do airport management and the TSA 
work with each other, especially during times of crisis or tragedy? 
(l=not at all, 5=very well) 3.5833 24 responses 
TSA feels that airport management and TSA work well together 
16. In your current position in your organization, how comfortable would 
you feel suggesting new ideas regarding post-disaster 
readiness/awareness training? (l=not comfortable, 5=very comfortable) 
4.4 25 responses 
Average indicates most would feel comfortable, even more so than 
airport managers 
17. Do you believe that your organization would take any action if an 
employee were to approach management and suggest new training 
regarding post-catastrophe readiness and response? 
[ 20] Yes [ 4] No 
Significant? number of responses say yes 
18. Current methods of post-catastrophic readiness planning and training 
need improvement at this organization. (1=do not agree, 5=fully agree) 
2.7826 23 responses 
Average is middle of the road, showing need for improvement, but 
leaning toward disagreement with statement 
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19. Information regarding post-disaster procedures is readily available in my 
organization to anyone who needs access. (l=do not agree, 5=fully 
agree) 3.24 25 responses 
Average right down middle, access indeterminable 
20. Generally speaking, TSA employees are easy to work with. (l=do not 
agree, 5=fully agree) 
3.8425 responses 
TSA feels that TSA employees are easy to work with; more so than how 
the airport managers feel 
21. I am concerned that my organization would not be able to respond 
effectively to catastrophic event or terrorist attack. (l=do not agree, 
5=fully agree) 1.833 24 responses 
Average indicates they do not agree with this statement; organizations 
could respond to catastrophic event "or so they think"; TSA disagrees 
with this statement even stronger than airport managers 
22. I am concerned that the quality of response from my organization could 
result in the loss of critical information to track down the perpetrators of 
a terrorist event at my facility. (l=do not agree, 5=fully agree) 
1.9583 24 responses 
Average indicates they do not agree with this statement 
23. I believe that there is an "it won't happen here" attitude at this facility. 
(l=do not agree, 5=fully agree) 2.4583 24 responses 
TSA feels that that attitude does not exist at their facilities, for the most 
part 
24. I believe that proper and repeated training would improve my 
organization's response to a terrorist attack. (l=do not agree, 5=fully 
agree) 4.00 24 responses 
TSA understands that more training would be beneficial to the 
organization's response to an attack 
25. It is easier to communicate with a TSA employee who is: 
[ 1 ] A pilot [ 11] Has an aviation background [13 ] No preference 
No preference if they have an aviation background or not about 50% of 
time 
26. My organization is more reactive than proactive. (!=strongly disagree, 
5=fully agree) 2.7917 24 responses 
Average indicates slight disagreement with this statement. They may 
not want to answer that they are reactive so they answer proactive, but 
don't want to disagree strongly with the statement 
27. What percentage of the time do you think miscommunication between 
personnel result in poor planning? (circle one) 
10%4 20% 1 30% 3 40% 6 50% 60% 70% 1 80%4 
90% 4 100% 1 
51.667 
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TSA feels that miscommunication results in poor planning about 50% of 
the time. 
28. Have you ever received any training in the field of criminal forensics? 
[ 9] Yes [ 16] No 
More TSA employees have received training in criminal forensics, but 
more training is needed 
29. How frequently do the following interfere with communication between 
airport managers and the TSA? (1=never, 5=always) 
Acronyms (ex. TSA, DHS) 2.12 25 responses 
Personalities 2.88 25 responses 
Accessibility to one another 2.36 25 responses 
Technology 2.2 25 responses 
30. How often do airport managers and the TSA personnel use the following 
forms of communication? (l=never, 5=always) 
Written 3.44 25 responses 
Face-to-face 4.16 25 responses 
Electronic communication (email) 3.92 25 responses 
Phone 4.08 25 responses 
Radio 1.4 25 responses 
Other: _________ _ 
31. With regard to the creation of post -catastrophic planning, how effective 
are the following forms of communication? (1=not effective, 5=very 
effective) 
Written 3.8261 
Face-to-face 4.09 23 responses 
Electronic communication (email) 3.8696 23 responses 
Phone 3.522 23 responses 
Radio 2.182 22 responses 
Other: _________ _ 
32. How helpful would the knowledge of the following basic forensic 
protocol be in the creation of a post -catastrophic plan for your 
organization? (1=not helpful, 5=very helpful) 
Fingerprinting 2.333 24 responses 
Cadaver dogs 2.75 24 responses 
Odontology 2.435 23 responses 
Entomology 2.3636 22 responses 
Mental Health/Grief Training 3.5 24 responses 
Digital Photography 3.542 24 responses 
Other: _________ _ 
Data is inconclusive; however, TSA results for 32 are all higher than 
airport manager's results, indicating that TSA employees see the need 
for knowledge more so than airport managers. 
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33. Minimal knowledge of forensic protocols is not important. (!=strongly 
disagree, 5=fully agree) 
2.6522 23 responses 
34. I am interested in the topic of forensic criminal investigation. 
(!=strongly disagree, 5=fully agree) 
2.6087 23 responses 
Averages lean toward disinterest in forensics, but also lean toward 
forensics being important 
35. To the best of your knowledge, how close is your facility to the nearest 
nuclear power plant? 
[5 ] 50 miles [ 1 ] 75 miles [ 8 ] 100 miles [ 4 ] 200 miles [6 ] Don't 
know 
Some TSA employees don't know distance. 
